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INTRODUCTION 
The boy divided his attention between the black clouds 
forming in the sky above the beach and his intricate sand 
castle. Only when the rain began filling his elaborate 
mote did he rise reluctantly and trot towards home. 
When the rain subsided two hours later, the boy, 
having been grounded for his wet and sandy appearance, 
convinced his younger brother to go to the beach and guard 
his sand castle. When the brother arrived on the beach, 
however, he found that another boy had confiscated his 
brother's property and was building ugly little huts around 
the beautiful castle. "What are you doing to my castle?" 
demanded the brother, assuming his older brother's role of 
ownership. "I've been here for an hour," replied the pres-
ent occupant, staring defiantly. "Where have you been?" 
Both boys stood their ground, refusing to yield an inch of 
sand . 
This scenario represents the problem of right and 
wrong in today's world. Most people view themselves as 
right. In the words of an Israeli social scientist , "'Per-
ceptions are as important as reality if decision-makers 
• 
operate on the basis that their perceptions are reality.' 
5 
6 
Actions and policies are made on the understanding of per-
ceived reality." 1 
Israel and the United States believe that the Israelis 
have the right to exist as a nation and that the Palestin-
ians do not have this right. The Palestinians believe that 
Israel, with the help of the Untied States, has usurped their 
land, and that they, the Palestinians , have the right to 
self-determination2 and statehood . 
Who, then, is right, and who is wrong? The writer of 
this paper believes that Israel's right to statehood has 
been used to justify the snffering of the Palestinians . 
When right is~ used to sanction another's misery, it becomes 
wrong. Therefore, hoping that she may strengthen an unpop-
ular position, the writer of this paper will look with Pal-
estinian eyes at the official positions of the United States , 
Israel, and the frontline Arab states of Egypt , Lebanon, 
Syria , and Jordan regarding the issue of the Palestinian 
right to self-determination and statehood. 
It is necessary to clarify some basic terminology used 
in this paper. The term "Palestine" will refer to the area 
known as Mandate Palestine . This does not include the area 
now known as Jordan, but does include the Israeli-occupied 
1As quoted by John Edwin Mroz in Beyond Security: 
Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israeli at, ... ( New Tt)rk: 
International Peace Academy, Inc., 1980 ~ - , p.27 
2self-determination is a "decision by a territorial 
unit as to its future political status .'', 2nd ed. (1949), 
s . v. "Self-determination." 
territories known as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and 
the Golan Heights. The term "Palestinian11 will refer to 
those persons who are or were refugees of Palestine. The 
term "Middle East 11 will refer to the region consisting of 
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, 
3 United Arab Emirates, Yemem (Aden), and Yemen ( Sana ) . 
To understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one 
must first h~ve a historical knowledge of the conflict. 
This paper will overview the history of Palestine before 
and during the British mandate of 1922 and the history of 
the Palestinians after Israel became a state in 1948. 
3For a map of the Middle East, see page A. 
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PART I: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Chapter 
I. PALESTINE BEFORE THE BRITISH MANDArE 
( 3500 B.C.-A. D. 1922) 
II. PALESTINE DURING THE BR:TISH MANDArE 
(1922- 1947) 
III. THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION 
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
(1948-1984 ~ 
CHAPTER I : 
PALESTINE DURING THE BRITISH MANDATE 
(3500 B.C.-A.D. 1922) 
The Jews first moved to Palestine around 1900 B.C. 
They remained there until the Babylonians forced them into 
exile in 586 B. C. When the Persian king, Cyrus, conquered 
Babylonia 50 years later, he allowed the Jews to return to 
Palestine . In 63 B.C., the Romans invaded Palestine, then 
known as Judah, and it became a part of the Roman Empire. 
Conflicts occurred when the Jews desired autonomy , and the 
Romans forced the Jews to flee in fear of persecution, leav-
ing only a small minority of Jews in Palestine . 
The Arabs came to Palestine around 3500 B.C. They 
conq uered the area of Palestine in the A. D. 600's in order 
to spread their newly adopted Islamic religion . Other peop-
les, including Turkish Seljuks , European Christian crusaders, 
followers of the Muslim Saladin, and Egyptian Mamelukes, 
controlled Palestine until the Ottoman Turks seized power 
in 4 A.D • . 1517. 
The majority of the :Palestinians under Ottoman rule 
were Arabs and could be divided into two basic classes: 
the Fellaheen or peasantry and the Madiyeen or townspeople. 
90~ of the Palestinian Arabs were fellaheen and lived 
in villages on communally owned lands. Land, family , and 
4world Book Encylopedia, s .v. "Palestine," 1984 
10 
1 1 
village were vitally important to them. Each _ _village had 
a council of elders to decide important matters for the 
people. Because the Ottomans lacked a strong state , the 
fellaheen became accustomed to defending their villages 
against frequent raids by desert-dwellers called Bedouins . 
These village-centered activities developed a national 
consciousness in the Palestinian Arabs, which would later 
grow into a desire for statehood . 
The life of the fellaheen was relatively stable until 
1858 when the Tanzimat or Land Code was introduced in order 
to save the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The land reform re-
quired the registration of land and the monitization of 
taxes:. The Arab peasants, who owned their lands communally, 
realized that individual ownership would prevent village 
people from allocating new land . to their sons, and that 
there was a possibility of increased taxea for individuals. 
In order to preserve their way of life, the peasants sold 
their land to the townspeople with the agreement that the 
fellaheen would control distribution of the land. This 
worked until the townsp~ople began to sell the land to dis-
tant notables. The new owners charged high tenancy fees 
which the peasants could not pay, forcing the peasants from 
the land. 5 
In the late nineteenth century, Jews be gan steadily 
movine into that part of the Ottoman Empire called Palestine . 
r.:: 
?Mart in Ziebell, "Pq,verty and Culture," Earlham College , 
June 2 , 1983 
12 
What caused them to leave their homes, and why did they come 
to Palestine? 
The Jews came to Palestine to escape persecution, and 
many came as a result of Zionist movement. Zionism had many 
forms: cultural, religious, and political. Theodore Herzl, 
the founder of political Zionism, promoted the colonization 
of Palestine ~nd the strengthening of a Jewish national con-
sciousness. In 1897, he formed a Zionist Congress whose aim 
was "to create for the Jew.ish people a home in Palestine 
secured by public law." 6 
The Jews chose Palestine as their home for natural 
reasons: the Jewish lifestyle was saturated with references 
to Palestine, the Hebrew language was common th both European 
and Palestinian Jews, and, at one time, the Jews were auton-
omous in Palestine. Also, the Jews claimed biblical rights 
to Palestine. 
Early in the twentieth century, the Jews saw their 
chance to obtain approval by law for a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. The British had gained control of the Suez Canal 
and showed interest in surrounding lands. After the begin-
ning of World War I, Theodore Herzl began talking to British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur James Balfour 
about the possibility of a Jewish homeland ~n Palestine. 
The result of thBse negotiations was the issuance of the 
6charles R. Gellner, The Palestine Problem, (Washing-
ton D.C.: Library of Congress, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 
50' 19 4 7) ' p. 3 
13 
Balfour Declaration in October of 1917. The declaration 
read as follows: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishmant in Palestine of a nationa l home for 
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours 
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exist-
ing non-Jewish communities in Palestine , or the rights 
and poli1ical status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country. 
The phraseology of this declaration was purpose-
fully vague. For example, there was no precedent for the 
term "national home"; hence, int erpretations of the term 
varied. Many people believed the term to be the equivalent 
to "state" or "commonwealth". 
Another carefully worded phrase read, '' ••• it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Pa les tine ••• " It is important to 
note that the declaration only guaranteed th e "civil" and 
"religious" rights of the non-Jewish communities in Pales-
tine. It failed to mention their political rights. Later, 
however, when British Commander David G. Hogarth was sent 
to explain the Ba lfour Declaration to King Hussein, the 
leader o f the Arabs , Hogarth assure·d the king that "Jewish 
settlement in Pa lestine would only be allowed in so far as 
would be consistent with the political and economic freedom 
of the Ara b population." 8 The fact that Hogarth used the 
7 Ibid, p . 6 
8 Ibid , p.11 
14 
term "political" instead of "civil" seemem to be an incon-
sistency in British policy . 
King Hussein's reply, on behalf of the Arabs, was that 
he would provide a refuge for the Jews, but that Ara b sover-
eignty over Pa l es tine would n ot be surrendered . 
The Jewish reaction to the Balfour Dec l aration was made 
cl~ar when the British Zionists held a celebration in the 
London Opera Houae . During the ga la, a Dr . Gaster stated 
that it was the Zionists' job to assign a meaning to the 
term "national home" which would be closest to the original 
meaning decided upon by the First Zionist Congress . That 
meaning , according to Dr . Gaster , was the es t ablishment of 
an " ••• autonomous Jewish Commonwealth in the fullest sense 
of the word . "9 
The American reaction was summed up by President 
Wilson's statement that '' ••• our Government and people are 
agreed that in Pales t ine there shal l be l a id the foundations 
of a Jewish Commonwealth ." 10 The United States government 
was interpreting the term "national home" in a way favorable 
to the Zi onists . 
9Ibid , p .1 0 
10 Ibid, p.14 
CHAPTER II 
PALESTINE DURING THE BRITISH MANDATE 
(1922-1947) 
After World War I, disputes arose concerning promises 
made to the Arabs by Great Bri tain before the war. In order 
to persuade the Arab world to aid them in defeating Turkey, 
the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, 
promised that Great Bri tain would recognize Arab indepen-
dence in certain Arab territories. In a letter written to 
King Hussein in October, 1915, McMahon agreed that the boun-
daries would be " ••• the Red .Sea--Indian Ocean--Persian Gulf 
line, Persia on the east, the Mediterranean on the west and 
what is roughly the present southern boundary of Turkey on 
the north .'' 11 There would, .however, be these exceptions: 
"The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of 
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, 
Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab , and must 
on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation ••• '' 12 
The Arabs believed the proposed independent territory to in-
elude Palestine and entered the war on this account. It was 
McMahon's intention, however, to exclude Palestine from the 
delimitation, and he believed that King Hussein understood 
this. He later made a public statement to that effect. 
11 Ibid, p.16 
12 Ibid, p .17 
15< 
16 
Despite these disputes, Great Britain found herself 
in military occupation of Palestine after the war and some-
thing had to be done with the ungoverned territory. At the 
Peace Conference in Paris on January 18, 1919, the newly-
created League of Nations adopted the mandates system to 
administer territories detached from Germany and Turkey during 
the war. Under this system, occupied territories would be 
managed by various Allied Powers, presumably until these 
territories could gain autonomy. Palestine became a man-
date of Great Britain in 1922. 
There are two documents which are important in dis-
cerning opinions about the Palestine problem at the time of 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The first appeared in 
a report to the American Peace Conference delegation by the 
Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence . 
It reccommended that the League of Nations recognize Pales-
tine as a Jewish state as soon as it became a Jewish state 
in fact. It further stated that, "It is right that Palestine 
should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given full 
opportunity, make it such . " 13 
The second document relevant to opinion at the time 
of the Peace Conference was written by Henry C. King and 
Charles R. Crane , after they had been sent by President 
Wilson to investigate Near Eastern sentiment concerning 
the Palestine problem . Although their report reached the 
conference too late to have any effect on it, the results 
~ 3Ibid, p . 26 
17 
of their investigation opposed an extreme Zionist program 
for Palestine. The King-Crane Commissi on reported that 
'' ••• 'a national home for the Jewish people' is not equiv-
alent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can 
the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished with-
out the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine .'" 
A fact that came out repeatedly in the Commission's con-
ference wi th Jewish representatives was that the Zi onists 
looked frirward to a practically complete dispossession of 
the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various 
forms of land purchase. Said the King-Crane Commission, 
11 
•• • it is to be remembered that the non-~ewish population 
of Palestine--nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are emphati-
cally against the entire Zionist program. The tables show 
that there was no one thing upon which the population of 
Palestine were more agreed than upon this ••• n 14 
The Arab dissatisfaction mentioned by the King-Crane 
Commission was revealed in a public way when , in 1921, frus-
trated Arabs rioted in Jaffa and other areas of Palestine. 
The Arabs argued that the increasing Jewish immigration was 
causing too great a decrease in lands and jobs available to 
Arabs . As a result of this complaint, British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill officially enunciated British policy con-
cerning immigration into Palestine . Churchill said that 
14I."bid, p.27 
18 
the immigration could not be so great that Palestine could 
not absorb settlers into its economy . 
After Churchill discussed the immigration policy, he 
went on to talk about the establishment of a constitution 
in Palestine . In connection with this, he officially set-
tled the McMahen-Hussein dispute of 1915 by saying that the 
boundaries of Arab independence definately excluded Palestine . 15 
When the United States heard Churchill's statement on 
Pa l estine , it felt that an official declaration of Congress 
concerning the problem of Palestine was in order . The reso-
lution, which was signed by the President in September of 
1922, stated that the United States favored the establish-
ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people 
but that nothing should be done to prejudice the rights of 
Christians and other non-Jewish communities in Pa lestine. 
This resolution sparked American interest in the problem of 
Palestine . 
Since the United States refused to participate in the 
League of Nations , they were not invited to join the negot-
iations concerning the mandates. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
State Department insisted that the United States had rights 
in these mandated territories due to the fact that the U.S. 
had participated in the war and was a contributor to its 
success . In 1924, an agreement was signed by the United 
States and Great Britain concerning the administration of 
the mandate of Palestine . Great Britain would administrate 
15Ibid , p.32 
19 
the mandate and would modify the mandate if necessary. The 
United States could decline to accept as applicable to Amer-
ican interests any modifications damaging those interests. 
After the mandate policies were determined, there was 
another problem to which the British turned their attention. 
Great Britain had promised Arab independence in certain ter-
ritories, and the area lying east of the Jordan River was 
within the boundaries of these territories. In 1922, the 
British government, with the approval of the League af Nat-
ions, exempted Trans-jordan from the mandate clauses dealing 
with the Jewish national home. No Jews have been allowed 
to acquire land in Trans-jordan. In 1946, Trans-jordan, 
16 
now known as Jordan, became a state. 
In 1925 and 1926, when the amount of Jewish immigrants 
entering Palestine was greater than its absorbing capacity, 
argument arose from the Arabs concerning this problem of Jew-
ish immigra tion. Later, in 1928, these arguments erupted 
into Jewish and Arab rioting, when it was believed that rel-
igious rights were violated a t the Wa iling Wall, a shrine 
sacred to Jews and Ara b s alike. Approximately 200 deaths 
occurred during the rioting. 
A commis s ion of inquiry was charged by th e British to 
investiga t e the cause of the riots. Among these causes, the 
commission, led by Sir Wa lter Shaw , listed the problem of 
land ownership and tenancy. According to the Shaw Commission, 
16 Ibid, p.32-39 
20 
" ••• between 1921 and 1929, as a result of large sales of 
land, Arab tenants were being evicted from their holdings." 17 
This was partially due to the Land Code of 1858. Other land 
was being sold to ' the Jews by wealthy landowners and Arab 
peasants who sold part of their land and used the money 
18 gained to increase the value of the remaining land. As 
a result of its investigation, the Shaw Commission reccom-
mended that His Ma j esty ' s Government should issue a clear 
statement of policy to be pursued in Palestine . 
The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations also had something to say regarding the rioting in 
Palestine . The Commiss~ ~n reprimanded Great Britain for 
~llowing the outbreak and redefined the essence of the man-
date for Palestine . The objects of the mandate were: "The 
establishment of the Jewish National Home" and "The estab-
lishment of self-governing institutions ••• " 19 The immediate 
obligation of Great Britain was to place Palestine under 
such conditions to make possible the objects of the mandate . 
Pressure from the Mandates Commission led Great Brit-
ain to issue the White Paper of 1930. This Paper stressed 
that despite some Zionist claims that the primary role of 
17Ibid, p . 69 
18Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great 
Britain and Palestine , 1915-1945, 3rd ed., (London and 
New York : Hyperion Press, Inc., 1946), p.57 
19Gellner, The Palestine Problem, p .7 2 
21 
the mandate was to create a Jewish national home, the British 
government still held that the rights of the non-Jewish pop-
ulation had equal importance. Said the Paper, any power 
given the Jewish Agency, the Jews' representative body, was 
permissive and not obligatory. The Paper further noted that:., 
as there was only 6,554 ,000 dunums of cultivable land in 
Palestine, there was no land available for agricultural set-
tlement by new immigrants. The Jewish Agency was criticized 
for employing only Jews to meet its labor needs. 
The Jewish reaction to the 1930 Whi t e Paper was ex-
tremely negative . Dr . Chaim Weizmann, ~ Jewish leader and 
later the first president of the state of Israel , resigned 
from the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. Others 
claimed that the White Paper violated the mandate. 
In February, 1931, British Prime Minister Ramsay Mac-
Donald issued a statement to clatify the White Paper . In 
it, he said that although the civil rights of non-Jewish 
people in Palestine must be safeguarded, this did not mean 
that these civil rights were to remain unchanged . In the 
same way, "the words of article 6, 'ensuring that the rights 
and position of other sections of the population are not 
prejudiced,' were not considered a barrier to Jewish immi-
gration and settlement .n 20 MacDonald also stated that the 
right of the Jewish Agency to employ only Jewish labor would 
be recognized. 
20 Ibid, p.78 
22 
Although the Jews were happy with the clarification 
of the 1930 White Paper , the Arabs felt that MacDonald's 
statement nullified the purpose of the 1930 document . 
By 1935, five Arab parties had been formed , but there 
was no one body representative of all of the Arabs . In 
November, 1935 , these five parties placed three demands 
before the British High Commissioner: "1)establishment 
of a democratic government; 2 )no more Arab land transfers 
to Jews; and 3 ) immediate cessation of Jewish immigration 
and the formation of a committee to determine the absorp-
21 tive capacity of the country ." 
When these demands were not met to the satisfaction 
of the Arabs , an Arab National Committee was formed in 
1936, calling for a general strike . In April of the same 
year , all Arab parties formed an Arab Higher Committee 
whose president was Haj Amin El Husseini, the Mufti of 
Jerusalem. This committee called for a continuance of the 
general strike and the implementation of the three demands 
placed before the British High Commissioner . 
A Royal Commission, of which William Robert Wellesley, 
Earl Peel, was chairman was appointed to investigate the 
causes of the 1936 disturbances and to make reccommendations 
concerning these causes . 
The Peel Commission listed two underlying causes for 
the 1936 disturbances: "1)The desire of the Arabs for nat-
ional independence, and 2)Their hatred and fear of the estab-
21 Ibid, p . 82 
23 
lishment of the Jewish National Home." 22 Their primary 
reccommendation was to create separ~t~ states in Palestine 
for the Jews and the Arabs. The Jews would have a state 
in the north and west while the Arabs would have a state 
in the south and east and would be joined to Trans-jordan. 
The Jewish reaction caused a split in the Jewish 
Agency, as half favored and half opposed the partition. 
The Arab reaction was one of united disapproval. 
The partition plan was finally pronounced impracti-
cable by the British in 1938. 
Another outcome of the 1936 disturbances was the 
British decision to dissolve the Arab Hieher Committee. 
Warrants of arrest were issued for six of its members, who, 
subsequently, fled or were deported to neighboring countries. 
In May, 1939, British Prime Minister MacDonald pub-
lished another White Paper concetning Palestine. The Paper 
was divided under the headings of constitution, immigration, 
and land. Concerning the constitution, MacDonald said that 
it was not the intention of Great Britain " ••• that Palestine 
should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of 
the Arab population of the country ••• His Majesty's Govern-
ment therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part 
of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State." 23 
The- Prime Minister went on to say that neither would Palestine 
be an Arab state, but that it would be ruled equally by both. 
22 Ibid, p.83 
23 Ibid, p.99 
24 
The future government of Pa l estine would be estab-
lished in ten years, in which time the Jews and Arabs of 
Palestine would be given grea ter authority . At the end of 
a transitional period, a representa tive body of Arabs and 
Jews would make reccommendations regarding the constitution 
of an independent Palestinian state . 
Regarding Jewish immigration, the British stated that 
they believed indefinate immigration would cause a perma-
nant enmity between the Arabs and the Jews. Therefore , the 
Arabs would decide the fate of future .immigration . 
However , for various reasons Jewish immigration could 
not be cut off immediately, so the British arrived at the 
following formula: 75,000 immigrants would be allowed to 
ent er Palestine within the next five years . They would be 
admitted at the rate of 10,000 per year for the next five 
years . 25,000'refugees from the war would be admitted when 
their maintenance could be insured . After this five years, 
no Jewish immigrants would be admitted unless by approval 
of the Palestinian Arabs. 
In reference to land, the Paper stated that in some 
areas land transfer to Jews was to b e restric t ed while in 
other areas , land transfer was to be stopped altogether . 24 
In reaction to the 1939 White Paper , the Arab Higher 
Committee , who had continued despite British opposition, 
forma lly denounced the Briti§h policy and again demanded 
the cessation of Jewish immigration . 
24 Ibid , p . 99-102 
25 
The Jewish Agency also rejected the White Paper. 
They stated that they had been deprived of their last 
hope. 25 Because of the Whi te Paper, Jewish resistance to 
the g overnment greatly increased. A reign of terror in 
the form of bombing.s, murders, robberies, arson, and wreck-
ings swept acros s Palestine. Illegal armed forces were 
organized, the most radical being the S tern gang , who, in 
1944, murdered Lord Mayne , the British Minister Resident 
in the Middle East . 
Jewish terrorism came to an abrupt halt at the start 
of World War II in September , 1939. Realizing the danger 
. t . tl 26 of Nazism, the Jews joined the British fight aga1ns Hl er . 
Illegal immigration grew enormously during the war. 
Acc ording to the 1tlhi te Paper of 1939, illegal immigrants 
would be subtracted from the regular quota laid down by l aw . 
On this basis, the British filled the regular quota with 
illegal immigrants for three periods during 1940 and 1941. 
For a time, deportation was utilized. 
As the circumstances of the war changed, the Jews were 
unable to fill their immigration quotas. By September , 1943, 
only 43,922 immigrants had entered Palestine . The five-year 
period in which 75,000 immigrants were to enter Palestine 
would end in March of 1944. That the remaining number of 
immigrants should not be allowed to enter due to the time 
factor seemed unfair to the Bri tish. Hence , the time was 
25Ibid, p.103-104 
26 Ibid, p.108-109 
26 
ext ended indefinat ely until the quota should be fi lled. 
Due to the deaths of six mi llion Jews and the per-
secution of many more Jews during World War II, large 
numbers of Jews began pouring int o Pal estine when the war 
had ended . The Arabs looked on as world sympathy was lav-
ished upon t he Jews. Novelist Ge orge Steiner had t his to 
say: "Any man can say 'Auschwitz,' and if he says it loud 
enough , everyone has to cast down his eyes and listen. It 
is like smashing a glass i n the middle of dinner ." 27 
By December , 1945, the 75,000 quota issued by the 
1939 White Paper had been filled . No further immigrants 
were to be allowed entry unl ess the Arabs approved . The 
British and the Americans decided to send a joint commit-
t ee to Palestine to discuss the sub j e6t of further immi-
gration. In the meantime , 1, 500 immigrants a month were 
allowed to enter Palestine . 28 
The attitude of the UJiited States towards th e Pales-
tine problem h a d been fairly neutral until ·world War II even 
though U.S. presid~nts had expressed symp athy for the Jewish 
cause and their right to autonomy . After the war , however , 
the United States was able to make public commitments to 
the Jews , due to a new world sympathy directed at the Jews . 
In 1944, President Roosevelt allowed the American 
27 As quo t ed by Alfred JVI . Lilienthal in "Israel's 
Flag is St ill not Mine , " Middle East Perspective XVI 
( October 1983):4 
28 Gellner , The Palestine Probl em , p .10 6-108 
27 
Zionists to state on his behalf that if he were re-elected 
he would help bring about the rea lization of a Jewish com-
monwealth . One year later, Pres ident Roosevelt a l so made 
a promise to Ki ng Saud of Saudi Arabia . Speaking f or the 
Americans , he said that no action would be taken tha t was 
hostile to the Arab pe opl e . 29 
I n December , 1945, a resoluti on was passed by the 
United States Congress concerning Palestine . The emphasis 
was that Palesti ne should be open to Jewish immigrati on in 
order to continue growing in strength as a Jewish nati onal 
home , and that Pa l estine shoul d become a democ ratic common-
wealth in which all men shall have equal rights . 30 
After the war ended in 1945 , there were three years 
of t ense argument which l ed to the formation o f the state 
of Israel in 1948 . 
Arabs became more unified in 1945 when Egypt, Iraq , 
Syria , Lebanon , Trans-jordan , Saudi Arabia , and Yemen joined 
together to f orm the Arab League . This organi za tion gav e 
united Arab representation to the Arab Palestinians . 
While the Arabs were becoming unified , the Sovi e t 
Union cho se thi s moment to pay it s first visit to Pa lestine . 
Ivan Ma i sky , Vice-Comissar of Foreign Affairs , was sent to 
represent Soviet interes t s in t he problem of Pa le s tine . 
In Au gus t of the same year , U.S . President Harry S 
Truman recommended to British Prime Minister Clement R. 
29Ibid , p . 113-114 
30 Ibid , p.11 8 
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Attlee that 100,000 immigrants be allowed to enter Palestine . 
The Arabs reacted negatively tofu.e recommendation and 
questioned a possible change in u.s. policy regarding hostile 
acts toward Arabs . In return , U. S . Secretary of State Byrnes 
assured the Arabs that they would be consulted " ••• should 
any proposals emerge which in our opinion would change the 
basic situa tion in Pe'lestine." 31 
In November, 1945, the creation of an Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry to investigate the Palestine problem 
was announced . Until the committee could make a decision 
regarding immigration , the rate of immigra tion into Palestine 
would remain at 1,500 per month. 
The Anglo-American Committee published its report in 
April of 1946. It recommended that 100,000 immigrants be 
allowed immediate entry into Palestine, but that Palestine 
remain neither an Arab nor a Jewish state . 
Though grudgingly approved by the <Jews , the recommen-
dations outraged the Ara bs. The right to decide the question 
of further immigration, given them by the 1939 White Paper, 
had been revoked without Arab consultation on the matter. 32 
In June, 1946, the Anglo-American Cabinet Committee 
was formed to assist the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry . 
The new cabinet suggested , as a so lution to the Palestine 
problem , that a provincial g overnment, made up of Ara b, 
Zionist, and central-governmental districts be se t up in 
31 Ibid, p .1 38 
3 2Ibid , p .1 39-144 
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Palestine . 
In the same month, members of the Jewish Agency Exec-
utive in Palestine were arrested after they were linked with 
terrorist activities. 
When Great Britain suggested a London Peace Confer-
ence to discuss the Anglo-American Cabinet's plan for a 
provincial government in Palestine, the Jewish represent-
atives refused to attend . They claimed the plan allowed 
them too small an area and that they could not be properly 
represented at the conference without the members of the 
Jewish Agency Executive who were being held for questioning 
in Palestine. 
The Arabs , likewise, refused to attend because the 
British would not accept Amin Husseini , the Mufti of Jeru-
salem, as a part of the Arab delegation to ;t.he conference. 33 
In October , 1946, President Truman expressed a desire 
that the 100, 000 immigrants, proposed by the Anglo-American 
Committee , by allowed into Palestine. He further related 
his belief that a compromise could be reached between the 
Anglo-American provincial government plan and the Jewish 
:plan for a. l arger land grant and greater autonomy. 
In response to President Truman's statements, King 
Saud of Saudi Arabia _wrote a l~tter saying that he beli eved 
the President had contradicted earlier promises made to the 
Arabs . President Truman disagreed with King Saud . He said 
the promise, that the Arabs woul d be consulted should any 
33 Ibid , p . 153-154 
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decisions be made affecting the basic situation in Pales-
tine, harl not been violated . The United States did not 
believe that 100,000 Jewish immigrants would change the 
basic situation in Palestine . 
Early in 1947, Great Britain set up a meeting with 
Arab and Jewish leaders to discuss possible peace solutions . 
Both sides agreed to attend the London Talks. At these 
peace talks, the British suggested that Palestine be div-
ided into J ewish and Arab areas , not necessarily adjoining , 
in which each would have a great amount of autonomy . A Brit-
ish trusteeship would be termina:f'ed:.... in five' years, a t which 
time an independent state would be created. Both Arabs and 
Jews rejected this plan. 
After the London talks, terrorism broke out anew in 
Palestine , directed mainly at the British government . The 
Irgun Zvai Leumi, a Jewish terrorist group, kidnapped two 
Britons in Palestine and blew up a police station in Haifa . 
To restore order, the British threatened to rule with martial 
law, demonstrating their threat by evacuating all British 
women and children and s t rengthening their military forces 
in Palestine . The British issued an ultimatum to the Jewish 
Agency to cooperate in bringing the terrorists to justice. 
When this failed, the British decided to turn the problem 
of Palestine over to the United Nations . 34 
In November , 1947, the United Nations proposed that 
34Ibid , p.160-163 
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Palestine be divided into two s t ates , one Jewish and one 
Arab . The Arabs rejected the plan . They said t hat the 
Arabs had permanent r i ghts to Pa lestine which res t ed on 
the following grounds: 
1) The right to dwel l there . They've don so since 
the year 3 , 500 B .C. without leaving the country. 
2 ) The natural right o f li fe . 3 ) The existence there-
in o f the Holy Land . 4 ) The Arabs are not aliens in 
Pa l estine and there is no intention to bring any of35 them from other pa r t s of the world to settle th ere. 
They further stated tha t the Jewish claim t o Pa l estine was 
unfound ed , 11 for to occupy a country and then l ea ve it 
entitl es no nation to claim and demand ownership thereof. 
36 The history of the world is full of s uch examples . "' 
In May , 19 48 , after much deliberation, th e Jews 
agreed to accept the United Nati ons' plan for Palestine 
and establ ished the state of Israel on t he l and assigned 
them by the United Na tions . 
35 rbid , p .11 4 
36 Ibid 
CHAPTER III 
THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
(1948-1984) 
After the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, a 
little less than 1 ,000 , 000 Palestinian Arabs were either 
forced to leave Palestine or left of their own accord . 
Several Arab states , having become independent, joined the 
Palestinians to fight the new Jewish state . By the end of 
the war, Israel controlled 75% of Palestine . Egypt and 
Jordan had the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of Jordan. 37 
In the early 1950's, refugees from what had become 
Israel began raiding the new state . Instead of attacking 
the elusive Palestinians, the Israelis retaliated with 
attacks against the Arab countries . 
When Nasser , Egypt's Prime Minister, asked Western 
nations for arms to defend his country against the Israelis , 
he was refused. Because Nasser turned to Russia for aid, 
the United St~tes withdrew a previous offer to help build 
a dam in Egypt . This initiated the polarization of the 
United States from Egypt and the Arab world. 
Nasser reacted to U.S. actions by seizing the Suez 
Canal from France and Great Britain. In October, 1956, 
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Great Britain, France , and Israel responded by invading 
Egypt . Pressure from the United States and Russia forced 
these countries to withdraw from Egypt, ,-a:ud a United Nations 
peace-keeping force was stationed along the Israeli border. 
Although Israel had attacked Egypt as a result of the 
Palestinian controversy, the war between Israel and Egypt 
was destined to become a private warfaxe, having little to 
d o with the cause of the Pales tinians. 
After 1956, Palestinians began to lessen their alleg-
iance to pan-Arab groups and to emphasize self-reliance . 
They created a guerilla group known as Al-Fatah to enable 
them to fight for their rights. This new self-reliance 
stemmed largely from a lack of successful acti on on the 
part of the Arab states . 
Whi l e the Palestinians were looking inward to their 
own strength, other Ara bs were busy converting the Palestin-
ian cause into an issue of inter-Arab politics. · " Abdul-
Karim Qassim of Iraq publicly committed himself to the 
establishment of a Palestinian entit'y ••• ;" 38 while the Arab 
states pledged a deeper commitment to the Palestinians in 
1964 at the First Arab Summi t Conference . At the conference , 
the Arabs adopted "practical resolutions necessary to ward 
off the existing Zionist danger in the technical and defense 
fi elds and to organize the Pa lestinian people to enable them 
to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and 
38Rashid Hamid , "What is the P.L.O.? , " Journal of 
Palestinian Studies IV ( Summer 1975):92 
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determining their destiny .-" 39 Ahmad Shuqairy , represen-
tative of the Palestinians at the Arab League, toured the 
Arab countries publicizing the Palestine Nationa l Council 
to be summoned in Jerusalem in May of 1964. At this meeting , 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was pro-
claimed. Al-Fatah became a part of this organization. 
In 1967, the Arabs , believing that the Israelis 
planned a major attack on Syria , sent military forces into 
the Sinai Peninsula . These Arab forces blocked the Strait 
of Tiran, which was the entrance to an important Israeli 
port. The Israelis considered this an act of war, and , in 
the next six days, Israeli planes almost completely destroyed 
the air forces of Egypt , Syria , and Jordan. Israel seized 
Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip , the West Bank from 
Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria . The so-called 
Six-Day War ended in a U.N. cease-fire. The Arabs said 
that they would recognize Israel if it gave up the occupied 
lands , but Israel wanted negotiations. By negotiating, 
Israel hoped to retain control of the occupied territories. 
In September, 1970, Pa l est i nians living in the West 
Bank of Jordan expressed displeasure with their political 
status in Jordan. The Jordanians, in return, resented the 
fact that the Palest inians had become so s trong , for the 
Palestinians were almost joint rulers of Jordan. This 
problem ballooned into a Palestinian rebellion against the 
39UAR , Ministry of National Guidance, Document s and 
Pa pers on the Palestine Question (Cairo: Ministry of Nat-
ional Guidance, 1969), p.1373 
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Jordanian Bedouin combat troops . King Hussein of Jordan , 
determined to end the rebellion , instructed his wel l -trained 
army to fire heavily upon the Palestinian guerillas posi-
tioned outside of their refuge e camps . About 2 , 000 people , 
m6st of whom were Pa l estinians , died in the incident known 
as Black September . 
On October 6 , 1973, in what was known later as th e 
October War, Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and fought 
ma j or battles with the Israelis on the Si-nai Peninsul a and 
on the Golan Heights . Cease-fires ended most fighting by 
November , and in 1974 , Arab and Israeli forces agreed to 
separate . In 1975 , Israel withdrew its troops from the 
far western Sinai . President Sada t of Egypt and Israeli 
Prime Minister Begin began discussing an end to the con-
40 flict in 19 77 . 
The outcome of tbe Egyptian-Is~aeli war greatly 
affected the Palestinian issue , for the maj ority of the 
Pa l estinian refugees lived on t he West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip . However , the war itself was n o t waged on behalf o f 
that issue . In actuality, the war served to isolate Egypt 
from the Pa l estinian probl em as the Egyptians concentra t ed 
on the issue of Israel i settlements on the Sinai Peninsula . 
I n 197 4 , t he P . L . O. was recognized by t he United Nat-
i ons as the officia l represent ative of t he Pal es t inians . 
In 1978 , President Sadat , Prime Minister Begin , and 
4°world Book Encyclopedia , s . v . "Middle East , " by 
Sydney N. Fisher , 1984 
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President Carter held discussions at Camp David in the 
United States . The Camp David Accords called for the 
following: Israel's withdrawal from all of the Sinai , 
autonomy for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank , a freeze 
on West Bank settlements, and a peace treaty between Egypt 
and Israel. This peace treaty was signed in 1979, at which 
time Israel partiall y withdrew from the Sinai . 41 
In order to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 
the United States designed a financial aid package to assist 
the two countries. This package provided Israel with $ 3 
billion, of which $800 million was to cover costs for relo-
cation of two Israeli airbases built on l and to be returned 
to Egypt . The rest, $ 2 . 2 billion, would finance foreign 
mili tary sa les credit and other Israeli relocation costs. 
Eg~pt was provided $1 . 8 billion; $ 1.5 billion in military 
sales credit financing and $ 300 million in economic aid 
42 loans. · 
Although the Camp David Accords and the ensuing peace 
treaty formed an excellent framework for peace in the rlliddle 
East , they did littl e to solve the Palestinian issue. An 
agreement under Article III of the Eeyptian-Israeli plan 
for peace prevented either party from participating in the 




42President Carter as quoted in "Middle East: U.S . 
Support for the Egyptian-Israell Peace Treaty ," Department 
of S t ate Bull etin , May 1979, p.59 
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the other part y . 4 3 This meant that the Egyptians would 
be unable to help any Palestinian group , such as the P . L . O., 
desiring the right to se l f-determination , for a Palestinian 
s t ate , according to the Israelis , would threaten Israel's 
security . 
The P . L . O. had been fighting the Israelis across the 
borders of southern Lebanon since the mid-19 70's. until they 
agr eed in·,198 1 to cease firing into Israel for a year . 
Claiming that the P . L . O. had resumed firing , the Israelis 
invaded Lebanon in 1982 to try to wipe out P . L . O. forces . 
To prevent the Palestinians from being s l aughtered , the 
United States , Italy , and France sent troops to oversee 
their safe depart ure from Lebanon . Many P . L . O. members 
were transported to Tunisia , Syria , and Jordan . The U. S ., 
French , and Ita l ian troops left a month later but had to 
return, along with British troops, after Israeli forces 
had allowed Lebanese Christian forces to massacre around 
750 Palestinians in two of their refugee camps . The troops 
from Italy , France , the Unite d States, and Great Britain , 
known as the Multi-National Force, sta~ed in Lebanon as 
a peace-keeping force to allow the country to rebuild its 
economy . All of these forces had withdrawn by April of 
1984 , leaving Lebanese , Syrian, and Israeli troops in 
L b 44 e anon . 
43"Treaty of'Peace Between the Arab Republic of 
Egypt and the State of Israel , " Department of State Bu l l etin , 




In March , 1983, Yasir Arafat , the leader of the 
P.L . O., traveled to Jordan to talk with King Hussein 
about President Reagan's September First , 1982, Peace 
Initiative . The initiative called for an immediate freeze 
on Israeli Wes t Bank settlement and self-government by 
the Pa l estinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association 
with Jordan . The initiative was against a Pa l estinian 
state in t he Wes t Bank and Gaza and Israeli annexati on or 
permanent cont r ol of these t erritories . Though the re s~lt~ 
of the Ara f a.t-Hussein meeting were inconclusive, "there 
were indications that the two l eaders were striving for a 
compromise formula that would try to bridge th e Reagan 
initiative and the plan approve d by 20 l eaders at t he 
A b S . t . F M l ast c~ep ·t ember . n 4 5 ra umm1· 1n ez , o r occo ~ The Fez 
plan called for the creati on of an independent Pa l estinian 
state with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
Most recent developments have been an enormous split 
in P . L.O . loyalties and Syrian attempts to replace Ara fat 
as leader of the P . L . O. In May , 1983 , some P . L . O. members 
protested when Ara fat promoted several controversial c om-
manders within Al -Fatah , the guerilla group which still ' has 
ab out 80~ of"the P . L . O.' s strength . The rebels a l s o b l amed 
Arafat f or their departure from Lebanon and criticized him 
for what they regarded as a moderate line of negotiation 
with Israel. The rebellion spread t hrough the summer months, 
45Marguerite Johns on, "Time for a Decision," Time, 
April 1983, pp.34-35 
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encouraged by Syrian President Assad who was enraged that 
Arafat would discuss President Reagan's September First 
initiative . Assad forced Arafat to leave Damascus and 
soon pushed the P .L.O. chieftain's loyal troops out of 
Lebanon's Bekka Valley and into Tripoli, a port city in 
Lebanon . In November , P .L.O. rebels, backed by Syrian 
troops, besieged loyal P .L.O. members stationed in the 
Pa lestinian refugee camp of Baddawi from their rebel base 
outsid e Baddawi . After the rebels overtook the refugee 
camp, Saud i Arabia arranged a cease-fire with Syria on 
behalf o~ the Pa lestinians . 
The day after the publication of the cease-fire 
agreement, Arafa t managed a lopsided exchange of Israeli 
and Arab prisoners . In return for six Israeli prisoners, 
Israel would release 4 ,500 Pa lestinian and Lebanese sol-
diers captured during the war in Lebanon. 46 
In l ate December , 1983 , Arafat and his loyal P . L.O . 
members l eft Tripoli aboard Greek ships bound for Tunisia 
and other places still willing to accept the Palestinians . 
46william E . Smith , "Heading off a Disaster , " Time, 
December 1983 , pp.156-158 
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An attempt has been made to show the present situation 
of the Palestinians by means of a historical overview of 
Palestine and its inhabitants from 3,500 B.C. to the present. 
These basic facts will help to clarify the Palestinian claim 
to self-determination and statehood, as well as views oppos-
ing this right. In order to understand why the Pa les tinians 
deserve the right to self-determination and statehood, one 
must look at the most important arguments surrounding this 
right from the Palestinian point of view. Tbese arguments 
come from Israel , the United States , and the frontline Arab 
states of Egypt , Lebanon, Syria , and Jordan and are cited 
in Part II: The Official Perspectives Conc erning the Pal-
estinian Right to Self-determination and Statehood . 
PART II: THE OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVES CONCERNING 
THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 
Chapter 
IV . THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE 
V. THE UNI TED STATES' PERSPECTIVE 
VI. THB FRONTLINE ARAB STATES' PERSPECTIVE 
CHAPTEH IV 
THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE 
The fo l lowing are the foremost Israel i views c on-
cerning the Palestinian right t o self-determi nati on and 
statehood . Below each v i ew is ( a ) the Israeli reasoning 
which substantiates its view , and ( b ) the Palestinian 
perspective of that view . The same format will be used 
with the United States and the frontline Arab states in 
chapters V and VI . 
1 . The Palestinians already have a state in Jordan . 
(a) In a 1979 summit meeting , General Sharon of 
Isra.el introduced the idea t hat Jordan was already a Pal-
estinian state because it had been a part of Palestine as 
directed by the United Nations in 1922 . He further stated 
that over 50~ of Jordan's population was Pa l estinian; that 
did n ot even include the 270 , 000 refugees on the West Bank . 
( b ) In 1920 , at the San Remo Conference , the Briti:sh 
were given the mandate of Palestine , which included at the 
time the state known today as Jordan . However , t wo months 
later , British Prime Minist~r Churchill appointed an Arab 
chieftain t o be ruler over modern Jordan . Si nce then , the 
land west of the Jordan River was known as P~lestine while 
the land east of the Jordan River was called Trans-jordan . 
~- 3 
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This became the official name in 1946 when the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Trans-jordan was granted its independence by 
the British . However , the land west of the Jordan River 
is the place from which the Palestinians draw their nat-
ional identity . Ask a Palestinian child in a refugee camp 
where he is from , and he will giv e the name of a village 
in the state of Israel . The P§lestinians argue that their 
oneness comes not from Jordan, but from a common hist ory 
and a common suffering that was shared on the west bank 
of the Jordan River . 47 
Another probl em with the consideration of J ordan as 
a Pal es t inian sta t e a r is e s when one looks a t t he interna l 
s t ruggl e in J ordan in 19 70 . Heavy fighting broke out between 
Jordanian Bedouin combat troops and Palestinian gu erillas . 
The war , which had been brewing since 1968 , was a result 
of resentment on both sides . The Palestinians refused to 
obey the Jordanian gun prohibition and rul ed their own 
refugee camps. On the other hand , King Hussein's govern-
ment did not give the Palestinians sufficient recognition, 
as they made up 65% of the population . In 1974 , at the 
Rabat Arab summit , King Hussein of Jordan was forced to 
renounce his claim as spokesman for the Palestinians . 
2 . If a Pa l estinian state were i n the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip , the security of Israel would be threatened . 
( a ) In a poll taken in 1979 , 89% of the people of 
47Martin Ziebell , "Poverty and Cul ture , " Earl ham 
Col lege, June 1983 
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Israel opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state 
48 i n the West Bank and Gaza . They believed a Palestinian 
state , with its Soviet backing, would be of grave danger · 
to Israel's security . The artillery with which the Soviet 
Uni6n already supplied the Palestinians had a range of 
10 , 000 meters . When one considered that there was only 
an S-mile stretch from the West Bank hills across Tel Aviv 
to the sea , there was no doubt that every Israeli citizen 
would be endangered . Added to this were the articles in 
the P . L.O . Covenant often referred to by the Israelis. 
These articles declared null and void the state of Israel 
and said that anything other than complete liberation of 
Palestine must be rejected and that all Zionist activities 
must be stopped . 
Israel continued it s argument by saying that even if 
the Palestinians were able to establish a state, there was 
no guarantee aga~nst terrorism . The instability of the P . L.O. 
was certain in light of the recent split due to conflicting 
loyalties , not to mention the many vengeful bombings and 
hijackings o f f ormer years . 
(b ) In Palestinian opinion, the Israeli threat to 
Palest i nian security was a far more serious matter . Had 
the Palestinians ejected the Israelis from Palestine , the 
threat to Israeli security might be better understood . 
4SSidney Zion and Uri Dan, "Israel's Peace Strategy," 
New York Times rllagazine, April 1979, p . 90 
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Instead, a history of suffering at the hands of the Jews 
was a story familiar to all Palestinians . 
Since the day the Jews drove them from their home-
land, the Palest inians have lived in the low condidtions 
of refugee camps, now located in territbries oc cupied by 
Israeli forces . The 1982 invasion and ensuing massacre of 
Pa l estinians in the Lebanon refugee camps of Sabra and Shat-
ila were further proof that the Palestinians were not safe 
from the Israelis. 
The most recent threat to Palestini an security lies 
in Jewish settl ement d.n the West Bank . Since 1967, Jews 
have been settling in occupied territories, of which the 
Wes t Bank is not the l east . The Israelis are content to 
ignore their agreement to implement -the Camp David Accords, 
which called for a freeze of further settlement in the 
Wes t Bank . Instead, they favor Begin 's statement in the 
Eretz Israel document that Israel should include the West 
Bank . Begin considers, .the land precious to Jewish religious 
history and refers to the West Bank by its biblical names 
of Samaria and Judea. 
It is obvious that Israel intends "to make the occupied 
territories dependent on Israel." 49 According to a P . L . O. 
official, they are implementing these intentions through· 
'' ••• their economic policies, their deportation and harass-
ment of the educated young, and their settlement policy." 50 
49Mroz, Beyond Security , p.94 
50 Ibid 
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The West Bank becomes more dependent on Israe l as 
the number o f j obs avai lable t o the Palest i nians on the 
West Bank are decreased . "The Internatiunal Labor Organi-
zation noted that be t ween 1970 and 19 78 there had been a 
drop of 6 , 000 employed people in the occupied terri to ries , 
while the active p opulation there increased by 34 , 600 
pe opl e and the number of Pales t inian ·.workers in Israel 
r ose fr om 20 , 000 to 70 , 000 . "5 1 
It was not eno ugh for Israel t o threaten the Pal es -
tinian ' s security by usurping the land oh. *hirih the Pa l es-
tini ans had resided for thousands of years . ~ Now Israel 
threatened the very identity of the Pa l estinians . For , as 
Jews moved into the occupied territ ories , Pa l estini ans were 
forced t o find jobs and homes in neighboring countries , 
thus becoming a part o f those countries . 
The Palestinians believed that the Israeli fear of 
terrorist activities was unfounded . Although the P . L . O. 
l argely pra c ticed terrorism in former years to direct world 
attention to their cause , their methods in the 1980 ' s have 
been more diplomatic for the most part . Regardless of 
any split in the P . L . O., the Pa lestinians would regard 
terrorism as unnecessary when they rece ive the right t o 
se l f-determination . 
51 
Ibid , p . 93 , Internationa l Labor Office , Geneva , 
" Action taken by the International Labor Off i ce at its 
59th to 64th Sess ions , " 19 79 , p . 43 
I . 
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3 . Mos t Arabs do not want a Pa l estinian state . 
( a ) Israel states that the ma jority of Arabs are 
against t hem and woul d like to drive them into the sea . 52 
The desire for territory, say the Israeli s , is more import-
ant to the Arab wor l d than is the cause of the Pa l es tinians . 
( b ) Though the Pa l estinians believe the majority of 
the Arabs are aga i nst the s t ate of Israel , they do not 
believe that t he whole of the Arab world p l acea the desire 
for territory above the Pa l estinian cause . Pro o f of this 
can b e found in Arab willingness to provide homes for the 
Pa l est i nians in their own countries , despi t e the resulting 
dama ge to t heir re l a tions with Israel . 
Even if this last Israeli all egation were true, it 
would n ot change the Palest i ni an position. In 1980 , in tbe 
seventh emergency sessi on of the United N~tions , the Assembly 
affirmed that the Pales tinians had , "inalienable rights ••• 
i ncluding their right to self-determinatign, and their right 
to establish their own independent , s overeign s t a t e . 1153 
The very meaning of self-determinati on denies tb e right of 
the Arab states or anyone else to t ell the Pal estinians 
what t heir future political sta tus will be . 
52Mro z , Beyon d Security, p . 2 1 
53 11 7th Emergency Spec i a l Sessi on ," UN Chronicle , 
Sept ember 1982 , p . 27 
CHA:PTER V 
THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE 
1. The United States will support the sovereignty of the 
State of Israel, but will not support establishment of 
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip . 
(a ) President Reagan, in the September First Peace 
Initiative of 1982 , stressed that the United States would 
not support the establishment of a Palestinian state in 
the .West Bank or Gaza , and that it would oppose any negoti-
ations threatening the security of Israel . 54 Resolution 
242 of the United Nations Security Council, upon which the 
former was based , said that inworder to ga in peace in the 
Middle Eas t , Israel must withdraw from territories occupied 
during the war , and that belligerent claims on territory 
must cease whi l e recognit ion of every state's right to be 
sovereign and have peace must commence . 55 President Reagan 
is firmly committed to these two soluti ons for peace in the 
Middle East . He believes that a peaceful settlement could 
be reached if the Pal estinian people were consulted . Pres-
ident Reagan is convinced that a so l ution will not be reached 
by consulting the P . L . O., as they will fight to the death 
54K· .th 1.r D . • . "A rp • ~ enne - n . am, _lme 
the l\Uddle Eas t," Department of 
p . 59 
for Reason and Realism in 
State Bulletin , June 1983 , 
55cordier and Harrelson, Public Papers of the Secre-
taries-General of the United Na tions, 8 vols . ( New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19 76), 7: 603-604 
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for a Pale,stinian stR.te. He .agrAes with U.S'. Deputy 5'ecre-
ti:ary of ' State Kenneth Dam, who said that ' 11 the 6-dav war was 
forced on Israel by the i mminent threAt of unprovoked R.pgres-
sion. " 56 
In a · talk with Meg Greenfield, editorial page editor 
of the Washingu~m Post, on April 24, 1983, U.S. Secret any 
of State Shultz commented that Kin~ Hussein of Jordan would 
not join in the Middle East peace talks hecause, among other 
reasons, he could oersuade Yasir Arafat to apree upon 
representation at the nevotiations. He further stated that 
he was not sure if the P.L.O. should continue to have the 
leadership of the Palestinian oeoole if they were not wflling 
to do something constructive when piven opportunitv. 
When asked if he would try to contact any Palestinian leaders 
while on his impending trio to the Middle East, Shultz rep-
lied, "No, I certainly have no olan to meet with anyone from 
the P.L.O., if that is what·~you're gettinf."57 
(b ) There are two facts which seem to constantJv elude 
the United States in its search for peace in the Middle East. 
One is the aforementioned idea of the "unprovoked aggress-ion" 
which was forced upon Israel. When the Jews began to immig-
rate to the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and eRrJy 
twentieth centuries, they carried with them the socia1istic 
dream of a Utopian state. No more would there be persecution. 
56Dam, "A Time for Reason ..• ", DePArtment of State 
Bulletin, June 1983, p.58 
57Meg Greenfield, "Secrete1ry's Interview on the Mirldle 
East," Department of State Bulletin, June 1983 ,, o. 64 
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But when they arrived, there were a lreadv peonle there~ 
Some Jews realized then that the moment the Arabs refused 
to be a part of their Utopian dream, this Arab dissatisfaction 
would ruin any hooe for a oerfect society. Most Jews, how-
ever, asked themselves if they ~ould reallv aJlow a few peas-
ants to destroy what was to be their perfect home l a nd in an 
age when colonialism prevailed. The a nswer, which marred 
any hope of a Utopia, has echoed across yeArs of bloody 
conflict. 
Another fact elusive to the United States is thAt the 
P.L~O~ is the legitimate represent ative of the Palestinian 
people~ Because thfs.fact is elusive to the U.S., decisions 
concerning the Palestinians are dealt with by the Arab states, 
Israel, and the United States. A Wes t Bank mayor aske<;i, "'How 
can representatives of three foreign governm~nts, Egypt, Israel, 
and the United States, determine the future of any other peo~­
pl~?'"58 The P.L~O.'s best known actions have painted a pic-
ture of blood across our television screen, as have many 
Israeli actions. This, and the fact that the P.L~O. will 
only settle for a Palestinian state, has labeled them as 
radicals' in the minds of U ,.s. officials. Meanwhile, Palest-
inian street demonstrations and riots are ignored. 
What U.S. officials do not recognize is that the P.L.O. 
continues to build hospitals, factories, schools, and a new 
computer center, while funding a pension system for families 
58Mroz, Beyond Security, p.91 
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of those who have died in the conflict and a scholarship 
program for university students. They also run a tax 
collection system and a democratic election of the Palestine 
National Council. 
2. The Palesti nians should hecome an autonomous entity in 
confederation with Jordan. · 
(a ) Another of President Reapan ts suggestions was 
that the Palestinians should become an autonomous entity 
in confederation. The Unit ed States chose Jordan for three 
main reasons: 1 )It bordered the West Ba nk, where the major-
ity of the Palestinian refugees are located, 2 ) J ord·an 's 
population was 65% Palestinian, a nd J )King Hussein had been 
an early spokesman for the Palestinian cause. The United 
States believed that a confederation would ~rant the Pales -
tinians autonomy and freedom from Jewish law, while Jewish 
security would he protedted by the stability of the Jordanian 
government. 
(b) The Palestinians maintained that they would be 
diss atisfied with anthing less than the right to self-deter-
mina tion. When asked about the oossihility of a link with 
Jordan, P.L.O. leader Yasir Arafat As ked, "Why don't ti-J.e 
Americans support self-determination for the Palestinians? 
Last Y''ear they ba cked se lf-determination for 2, 000 people on 
the Falkland Islands. So why do they refuse the same prin-
ciple for: 5 million Palestinians ?tt59 Despite Arafat 's harsh 
59Roberto Sura, "It is Ver y , Very Serious ," Time, <July 
1983, p.35 
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words, he, along with the majority of the Palestinians, 
expresses interest in a confederation with Jordan after 
the Palestinians have been pranted statehood& 
In reply to the American usage of the words ''entity" 
and "confederationu . to des-cribe the future Palestinian 
political status, two PalAstinian opinions are given. 
Upon finding the word entitv in Webster's Dictionary, a 
Palestinian was diseusted to discover that its meaning 
was uexistence 11 or "being". u'It means we will be given 
. t ? N h k w 1 d . I u60 our ex1s ence .... o, tan you ••• e a rea y ex1st. 
As far as becoming part of a confederation with Jordan, 
a Palestinian businessman said, '''Tell me what confederations 
in history have been so estab~ished ••• and what ever hannerted 
to your Western doctrine that sovereign states make up a 
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confederation?''' Jordanian officials, remembering the 
1970 civil war, ag~ee that before a confederation can take 
place, the issue of Palestinian statehood must be confronted. 
3. A clash between the United St ates and the Soviet Union 
must be avoided. 
(a) TTFrom 1968 to September 1973 the Soviet Union sent 
the Arab States 2,603 million dollars worth of arms. During 
that same period the United States sent the Arab States ~03 
million dollars worth of arms ••• "62 According to u.s. Deputy 
60Ibid, p. 169 
6.1Ibid , p. 169 , 170 
6~Martin Gilbert Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, , Inc., 1974), p.63 
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SecretRry of StPte KennPth Dam, one of the Unit ed St a tes' 
primary concerns' with its involvement in the Middle Eas t 
is the Prevention of a conflict between super-powers. 63 
· Should there be a Pa le s tinia n s t ate, the cha nce for war-
f are would gre Rtly increase. 
(b) The Pal~stinians do not feel thAt the threat of 
war will increase should they become a n independent state. 
Most believe tha t Palestinian violence against Israe l will 
end once they are r iven freedom to exercise their ri~ht to 
se]f~determina tion. 
63 K· h D ttA T· f R " D t t f ennet am, ·-· lme .. or ea son ••• ,- .. epar men o 
State Bulletin, June 1983, p.57 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FRONTLINE ARAB STATES ' PERSPECTIVE 
1. Tho~gh most Arabs publicly exoress a desire for a Pal-
estinian state, reasons for wanting this state differ. 
(a) The states of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt ~ have all 
agreed on one point: the Palestinians have the right to 
self-determination. Lebanon is non-committal on this 
subject. 
King Hussein of Jordan, at one time an official 
spokesman for the Palestinians, displayed his loyaltv to 
the Palestinian_cause by refusing to join any peace talks 
until the United States 1 )recognized the Palestinian right 
to self-determination, and 2lallowed the P.L.O. to join him 
at the peace talks. The Jorda nian king agrPed with the 
Palestinians that there could be no Palestinian conFederation 
with Jordan without first r ranting the Palestinians statehood. 
A confederation without st atehood would no doub t result in 
another Palestinian-Jordanien civil war. 
Hussein is also supportive of a freeze on Israeli 
settlement in the West Bank. He Bven went so far as to 
write a United Nations resolution to this effect and requested 
the U.S. to back the resolution. When the U.S, refused, Hus-
sein angrily accused that nation of failing to supnort Presi-
dent Reagan's September First initiative which called for an 
55 
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Israeli settlement freeze. 64 
Hussein resented Israeli Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon's claim that the Palestinians already had a state 
in Jordan. This suggestion, which imPlied thAt Hussein 
should turn the Jordanian government over to the Palestinians, 
caused a Jordanian politician with close ties to the king _ 
to say, "If we do not force the IsrAelis to negotiAte about 
the West Bank now, they will force us to negotiate over the 
East Bank 1Ater."65 
Although Syrian President Assad agrees that the Pal-
estiniaps have a right to self-determinAtion, his recent 
actions have shown his determinAtion to make Palestinian 
rights subservient to Syrian interests. When Syrian troops 
entered Lebanon in 1976, to help control a civil WAr, they 
purposefully supported the Christian rightists against the 
P.L.O., who supported the Lebanese Moslem leftists. Syria 
was accused then by the fedayeen, or peasant Palestinians, 
o~an anti-Palestinian olot. 66 The plot thickened when 
Assad backed an anti-Arafat rebellion with Syrian trooos 
and tanks. ~While Assad saw the PAlestinian cause as subor-
dinAte to his wider vision of Arab unity, ArafAt believed 
that the P.L.O. must remain independent of any ArAb nAtion."()? 
64Douglas Watson, "Why Jordan's Hussein Plays Spoiler 
Role," U.S. News Rnd World Report, April 19R4, p.49 
65Marguerite Johnson, "Time for a Decision," Time, 
April 1983, p.35 
66
"A Shaky Compromise in Lebr:mon," Time, June 1976, p.24-26 
67 James Kelly, "Bidding for a Birger Role," Time, Dec-
ember 1983, P.34 
'57 
The Soviet Union, who signed a peace treaty with 
Syria in 1980, has given military equipment to Syrians 
and Palestinians. The Sovie t opposes the break in relations 
between Arafat and Assad. 
Syria joined Jordan in opnosing the Reagan September 
First initiative, but for different reasons. Assad was 
against the initiative because it ivnored Syria ' s ambition 
for a major political role in the Arab reeion by denying 
Syria a voice at the peace talks. 
Despite the fact that the P. L.O. severed relations 
with Egypt in 1979 after Egypt sipned a neace treaty with 
Israel, Egyptian President Mubarak is fAvorable to a Pal-
estinian state. In an interview with Time magazine, Mubarak 
advised the United States to stop Israeli settlement in the 
West Bank before there was nothing left to negotiate. He 
called on .. Hussein to convince other Arab leAders to allow 
the Palestinians to join the negoti ations for peace. He 
also asked thAt ArafAt recognize Israel's right to exist as 
a nation in return for Israeli recognition o~ the Palestinian 
right to self-determination. Mubarak told the Time i_nter-
viewer that he believed that Israel could live in Peace with 
the Palestinians if they would stop being obstinate and give 
the Palestinians their rights. 68 
PerhaPs because of the Time interview, Yasir Arafat, 
in December of 1983, made the first official Palestinian 
68 
"An Interview with Mubarak," Time, January 19R3, n.4R 
visit to Egypt since 1978. Upon Arafat's arrival, Presid~nt 
Mubarak hailed him as "a stru)!gler and a moderate leader of 
the Palestinians whd are struggling to re)!ain the legitim~te 
rights of the Palestinian peonles."69 
or the frontline stPtes, Lebanon alone withholds aPP-
roval of the Pa l esti nian right to self-determination. The 
reason for this is certainly related to Lebanese President 
Bashir Gemayal's belief that the P.L.O. bears a moral respon-
sibility for the civil war in Lebanon. Twice, within four- \ 
teen months, the P.L.O. was expelled from Lebanon. Gemayel 
a llowed other Palestinians to stay , but said he would no 
70 longer tolerate their being a state within a state. 
(b) Lurking behind the comraderie of some of the 
Arab states, the Palestinians sense betr~yal. An Israeli 
Cabinet minister renortedly spoke with U.S. Secretarv of 
State Vance, who told him that, ·mEfynt, Jorda~, S'audi Arabia, 
a nd Syria were against the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, no matter what they said nuhlicly."71 The Palestinians 
suspect they are not only fighting Israelis, but Arabs ,gs 
well. Sine~ 1948, more Palestinians have been killed by Arabs 
than by Jews. 
The most auspicious of possible Palestinian enemies 
69
"Arafat Embrnces Mubarak in Cairo in Reconcilintion," 
New York Times, December 1983, sec. 1, pp.A1,A8 
70Wilton Wynn, "The Job: Rebuild a Country," Time, 
September 1982, p.31 
71 Zion and Dan, nisr-ael ' s Peace Stratep-y," New York 
Times Map-azine, April 1979, P.90 
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among the Arabs is Syria. In Damascus, a senior P.L.O. 
ff . . 1 . d "A d I • f d l t. . th th o 1c1a sa1 , · ssa s pr1ce _or goo re a 1ons w1 e 
P.L.O. has been the same for years. Syria must have a 
large, and if possible, commanding sav over the P.L.O.'s 
political direction."72 The Pa l estinians beliPve that Syria 
is intent on seizing control of the Palestinian movement, 
in order that it might gain political cower under the puise 
of helping the Palestinians. This desire for control is 
easi l y seen in Assad's attemnt to overthrow Arafat in the 
summer of 19g3. Even though Assad claimed to be aiding the 
Palestinian cause by ridding the P.L.O. of Arafat, a noll 
conducted in East Jerusalem after the P.L.O. split showed 
73 that 92 % of the people surveyed were loyal to Arafat. 
2. Arab op ~1n1ons differ concernine: the decision to recognize 
of Israel's right to exist as a nation. 
(a ) Syria refuses to recogni~e Israel and demands the 
return of the Golan Heights which Israel seized in the 1967 
war and annexed in 19g1. 
Jordan does not recognize Israel due to close ties with 
the P.L.O., whose official position is one of non-recornition. 
Since Lebanon and Egypt wanted to sign peace treaties 
with Israel, recognition of the Jewish state was imperative. 
(b) The Palestinians have settled on a comnromise cnn-
cerning recognition of the state of Israel. They h~ve not 
72Marguerite cTohnson, "Fac ine- Syria 's Challenges," 
Time, July 19g3, p.25 
73Ibid 
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made a public announcement to the effect tha t they will 
recognize Israel; however, at the Arab Summit in Fez in 
September of 1982, the P.L.O. and Arab states acknowledged 
Israel indirectly by refraining from publicly denouncing 
Israel as an illegitimate state. 
The Palestinians have a reason for refusing direct 
recognition of Israel. If the Palestinians recognize 
Israel as a state, they wi l l have nothing left with which 
to bargain. Said former We st Bank mayor Karim Khalaf, 
"This is the l 2st card. Arafat is ready for peace~ When 
he sits down with Israe l to negotiate--this is recognition." 74 
The Palestinians will recognize Israel when Israel is ready 
to recognize the Palestinian ri ght to self-determination and 
statehood. 
74
·chaim Shur a nd Liora Barash, "Ka rim Khalaf : 'U .. N. 
Resolutions Are the Bes t iJ'Tay to Peace, '" New Outlook: Middle 
East Monthly,February 1984, p.S 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to show that the Palestinians 
have a right to self-determination and statehood. Arguments 
against this right have been weighed carefully with Pales-
tinian scales and are found wantin~. 
Both the Palestinians and the Israelis believe that 
their arguments concerning Palestinians rights are just. 
Therefore, how can there ever be a resolution bf the Pales-
tinian conflict? 
The Palestinians believe the ri?ht to self-determination 
is theirs because they share a common history and suffering, 
because t~ey were forced to leave the land on which they had 
resided for centuries, and hec8use there Are over 4,000,000 
peopl e who have to have a home. 
Establishment of a Palestinian state can only become 
reality, say the Palestinians, if Israel and the United 
States will recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of 
the Palestinians and will allow the P.L.O. a voice in the 
peace talks. The Palestinians also claim that a freeze 
on West Bank settlements is vital to a neaceful solution. 
Israel does not agree that the Palestinians should 
have the right to self-determination. The Israelis believe 
that the Palestinians alreadv have a st8te in Jordan. Israel 
is also persuaded that most Arabs are avainst A Palestinian 
state. Why, then, should they risk allowin,~ a Palestinian 
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state to exist which would threaten their security7 
The Israelis believe the conflict would be solved 
if the Palestinians were absorbed by other Arab countries 
or if Jordan would consent to share its g oyernment with the 
Palestinians. 
Other opinions concerning the Palestinian right to 
self-determination, such as those fiven by the United States 
and the frontline Arab states of Egypt~ Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon, could be helpful or detrimental to a oeaceful resol-
ution of the conflict. 
The United States has alienated the Palestinians by 
supporting Israel's sovereignty, while withholding supnort 
for a Palestinian state. This pledge to Israel and the 
United States' fear of a clash with the Soviet Union, have 
greatly immobilized U.S. involvement in a peaceful solution 
for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
The frontline Arab states have showed themselves ready 
to defend, ignore, and control the outcome of the Palestinian 
situation. Jord~n and Egypt, especially the former, have 
openly supnorted the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
Both call for recognition of the P.L.O. as the legitimate 
sppkesman for the Palestinians and see the need for IsraeJ 
to stop settling in the West Bank. Lebanon has been emhit-
tered by the Palestinian involvement in its civil war, and 
therefore, ignores the Palestinian cry for Arab support. 
Syria, in a play for power, has tried to control the outcome 
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of the Palestinian situation by sunporting rebellion within 
the P.L.O. 
The time factor nlays a vital role in a neaceful reso-
lution. If Syria succeeds in controlling the P.L.O., any 
steps toward peace which Arafat has already taken will be 
annulled ~ Also, the Palestinians will have lost any chance 
for legitimate representation by the P.L.O. 
Another time problem revolves around Israeli settle -
ment in the Wes t Bank. These settlements are bei ng constructed 
so quickly, that if a few years, there will be no land left 
with which to ne~otiate. 
Clearly, any action concerning the neaceful resolvement 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be taken immedi a tely. 
The people of the United States could hold the key to this 
resolution. A poll taken in 1977 and agaln in 19S2 . showed 
that U.S. citizens are becoming more favorable to a Pales-
75 
tinian state. A change in the U.S. policy which refuses 
to support a Palestinian state will only occur if U.S. citizens 
are willing to pressure their congressmen to amend the policy. 
Should U.S. policy ch~nge, the Israelis mi ght he per-
suaded to meet with the P.L.O. under the umbrella of the 
United Nations. Since the U.N. has already recopnized the 
Palestinian right to self-determination, U.N. involvement 
could result in Palestinian statehood. 
All of this conjecture can become reality if neople 
75connie DeBoer, "The Polls: The Arab-Israeli Conflict," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1983, p.125 
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will recognize that the Pal estinians are not merely flea-
like nuisances, but that they have a lepitimate ri~ht to 
self-determination and statehood. When the oeonle of the 
world look a t the Palestinian-Isr ~ eli conflict from the 
Palestinian viewpoint, they will understand when people 
like Palestinian author Fawaz Turki say, "I was a Palestinian 
and the name had a cadence to it. I was not the bewildered, 
wretched native of the land; I was the native son. 1176 
76Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of a Pal-
~stinian Exile, (London: Monthly Press Review, 1972) 
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